> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://darkwebinformer.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # ToxC2 Sells a Cross Platform Agent That Runs Its Command Channel Over Tox - URL: https://darkwebinformer.com/toxc2-sells-a-cross-platform-agent-that-runs-its-command-channel-over-tox/ - Published: 2026-08-28T16:38:15.000Z - Updated: 2026-08-28T16:38:15.000Z - Author: Dark Web Informer Malware Listing Remote Access Trojan Windows, macOS, Linux 70 USD ## ToxC2 Sells a Cross Platform Agent That Runs Its Command Channel Over Tox A seller posting as **Reze** is advertising **ToxC2**, a command and control agent priced at **70 dollars** for builds covering Windows, macOS and Linux. The distinguishing feature is the channel: rather than calling home to a server, the implant **sends a contact request to the operator over the Tox messaging protocol** and is then driven by text commands in an ordinary chat client. The listing describes an interactive shell on each platform, file retrieval, screen, webcam and microphone streaming, autorun persistence on all three operating systems, **anti analysis checks and tampering with Windows logging and script scanning interfaces**, and self deletion on machines that appear to be in the seller's own region. Capabilities are **as advertised and unverified**. Severity HIGH [ ![WhiteIntel, dark web exposure monitoring](https://storage.ghost.io/c/6b/16/6b16ac9c-cd67-432f-b0f3-bbec941084ff/content/images/2026/08/whiteintel_io_banner.jpg) ](https://whiteintel.io/?utm%5Fsource=darkwebinformer.com&utm%5Fmedium=referral&utm%5Fcampaign=whiteintel) Price$70 PlatformsThree C2 channelTox SellerReze ### ▣Listing details ProductToxC2 TypeC2 agent, remote access CountryNot stated PlatformsWindows, macOS, Linux Price70 USD, three builds BuildStatic C binary, about 2 MB ObservedAug 27, 2026 SellerReze ### !What the listing claims - Control through a chat client - Operator added by contact request - Persistent interactive shell - PowerShell on Windows - Shell on a PTY for Linux and macOS - File download from the host - File delivery to the host - Desktop streaming - Webcam streaming - Microphone capture - System and drive enumeration - Process and network listing - Geolocation lookup - Power and session control - Logging and script scanning tampering - Debugger, VM and sandbox checks - Autorun on all three systems - Self deletion on command ### ◱Screenshots [ ![Forum listing advertising a cross platform command and control agent named ToxC2, August 2026](https://storage.ghost.io/c/6b/16/6b16ac9c-cd67-432f-b0f3-bbec941084ff/content/images/size/w1304/format/webp/2026/08/1249781938275698273569873429872356987153.png) Screenshot 1 Redacted preview ](https://storage.ghost.io/c/6b/16/6b16ac9c-cd67-432f-b0f3-bbec941084ff/content/images/size/w1304/format/webp/2026/08/1249781938275698273569873429872356987153.png) [ ![Second section of the same listing stating price and delivery terms, August 2026](https://storage.ghost.io/c/6b/16/6b16ac9c-cd67-432f-b0f3-bbec941084ff/content/images/size/w1304/format/webp/2026/08/1249781938275698273569873429872356987154.png) Screenshot 2 Redacted preview ](https://storage.ghost.io/c/6b/16/6b16ac9c-cd67-432f-b0f3-bbec941084ff/content/images/size/w1304/format/webp/2026/08/1249781938275698273569873429872356987154.png) Forum listing advertising the ToxC2 agent, observed 27 August 2026. ### ☷Mapped techniques Mapped from the seller's own description. Advertised, not confirmed. - Command and control [T1071](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/) Application layer protocol Stated Control runs entirely over a peer to peer messaging protocol, with the operator reached as a chat contact rather than through a server the implant connects back to. - Execution [T1059](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/) Command and scripting interpreter Stated A shell is held open for the session, using PowerShell on Windows and a terminal on Linux and macOS. - Persistence [T1547](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/) Boot or logon autostart execution Stated Autorun is established on first execution using the startup folder on Windows, a user service and scheduled task on Linux, and a launch agent on macOS. - Defense evasion [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/) Disable or modify tools Stated The Windows build claims to patch the event tracing and script scanning interfaces that endpoint products rely on for visibility. - Defense evasion [T1497](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/) Virtualisation and sandbox evasion Stated Optional checks for debuggers, virtual machines and analysis sandboxes are offered as a build option. - Discovery [T1614.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001/) System language discovery Stated Keyboard layout and locale are read to identify machines in the seller's own region, where the implant removes itself. - Collection [T1113](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/) Screen capture Stated Desktop streaming is offered alongside webcam capture and microphone listening, each through the native capture framework of the platform. ### ⚠Potential impact The capability list is unremarkable for a remote access tool. **The transport is the part worth attention.** Because control runs over a peer to peer messaging network, there is **no domain to sinkhole, no address to block and no certificate to inspect**, and traffic looks like an ordinary chat client rather than beaconing to infrastructure. Defences that lean on network indicators lose most of their grip, which pushes detection back onto **host behaviour**: an unexpected process holding a shell open, autorun entries in the startup folder, a user level service and scheduled task, or a launch agent that nobody installed. The **region check is also informative**, since an implant that deletes itself on machines matching the seller's own locale tells you where the operator is and where victims will not be. At **70 dollars for three platforms**, the barrier is low enough that this lands with unskilled buyers rather than organised operations, which usually means noisy, opportunistic use against individuals rather than targeted intrusion. One claim in the listing **contradicts another**: it advertises that nothing is written to disk, while also describing autorun entries and a binary that can later delete itself. Both cannot be true, and the persistence description is the more credible of the two. ### iStatus Unverified Everything here is **a sales claim**. No sample, hash or build has been published, so none of the evasion or streaming capability can be checked, and there is **nothing for defenders to use as a detection artefact** beyond the behaviours described. The seller account is **new and carries almost no standing**, registered within the last six months with a handful of posts and a token deposit, which on this kind of forum is the profile of an untested vendor rather than an established one. The stated test matrix is worth noting: the macOS coverage is described against a **release now several major versions old**, which predates much of the current consent framework governing camera, microphone and screen recording access. If accurate, that suggests the macOS build is considerably less capable in practice than the listing implies. Dark Web Informer has **not obtained the builds and is not linking the seller's contact channel** or the hosted screenshots. Want everything on this listing? **Paid subscribers** get the full unredacted claim details and more. After subscribing, check out the [threat feed](https://darkwebinformer.com/threat-feed/?utm%5Fsource=alert&utm%5Fmedium=card&utm%5Fcampaign=toxc2-2026-08-27&utm%5Fcontent=threat-feed) and search there for this alert. [View pricing →](https://darkwebinformer.com/pricing?utm%5Fsource=alert&utm%5Fmedium=card&utm%5Fcampaign=toxc2-2026-08-27&utm%5Fcontent=pricing-button) [Dark Web Informer](https://darkwebinformer.com/?utm%5Fsource=alert&utm%5Fmedium=card&utm%5Fcampaign=toxc2-2026-08-27&utm%5Fcontent=footer) // Threat Intelligence